79 years since the destruction of Hiroshima

In the immediate aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, President Harry Truman declared that “The Japanese started the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They paid for it many times over”; and after Nagasaki on August 9, “We used it [the atomic bomb] to shorten the agony of war, to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans.”

Letting aside the undignified for a civilized country revenge inherent in the first statement, the justificatory basis for the use of the bomb had been established: dropping the bomb hastened the end of the war, and prevented hundreds of casualties between both belligerents in the event of an American invasion of Japan. Since then, it will be, outside and especially within the United States, the main argument of those who argue that the two cities were well bombed.

This easy-to-understand narrative is both morally reassuring to citizens, but not unshakable. The essential question is whether there was a feasible alternative to Japanese capitulation without the use of the atomic bomb before November 1 – the day of the planned American invasion of Kyushu Island according to Drawing:Olympic. Furthermore, even if it were agreed that the use of the bomb was a one-way street in order to hasten the end of the war, would its use be justified? The first question must be answered on the basis of historical evidence, the second is a moral question, but both were intertwined in the decision making.

Today, 79 years later, no intelligent person disputes that Hiroshima was an event of immense significance for humanity, and that it has emerged as a symbol of biblical proportions of devastation. Its sanctification helped to raise the taboo of the separation of conventional and non-conventional weapons, hence to establish the policy of mutual nuclear deterrence, thanks to which we have not experienced the end of the anthrax

The essential question is whether there was a feasible alternative to Japanese capitulation without the use of the atomic bomb before 1 November – the day of the planned American invasion of Kyushu Island according to Drawing:Olympic.

Anything that reinforces these assumptions fortifies our defenses against the prospect of a universal or localized nuclear conflict. “All is permitted in love and war,” goes the saying, meaning that in the former all lies are permitted, in the latter all atrocities are permitted. This logic, however, gives rise to nihilism and intellectual sloth. If everything is permitted, no one is responsible for anything. A war must be governed by principles, and it will only acquire them if we are able to discern moral and political differences in all its situations, so that we can recognize the fine, permissible limits of warfare, and understand who, how and why determines good and evil in times of crisis.

1.

On April 12, 1945, Harry Truman was rushed to the White House. When Eleanor Roosevelt informed him that the president had died, he is said to have asked her if there was anything he could do, and she replied that you were the one with the worries. Roosevelt had deliberately kept him in the dark about what was agreed to at Yalta and the Manhattan Project to build the first atomic bomb. Acting wisely, he kept the entire Roosevelt apparatus, appointing only his friend James Byrne as the new Secretary of State – a choice that would prove crucial in the next four months. Many argue, and they are probably right, that Truman was inexperienced and impulsive, but it is a mistake to explain the strategy he pursued in psychological terms.

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Of course, the hard times were over. Germany was counting the days until its unconditional capitulation, and Japan was effectively defeated and the countdown to its surrender had begun. Moreover, Stalin decided not to renew the five-year Neutrality Agreement (1941-46) with Japan. His decision confirmed his commitment at Yalta that, after the surrender of Germany, he would declare war against Japan within three months. The Japanese were surprised by the lifting of this ‘strange neutrality’, but the moderates typically had another year to achieve an acceptable capitulation. False hopes, as will soon become apparent. What is certain is that the Soviet Union was now entering as a weighty factor in the US administration’s decisions regarding the geopolitical future of the Far East.

The decision that the atomic bomb would be used against Japan was made last year. The decision to build it had been made so that the Allies could catch up with the Germans who were ahead. This reason evolved when it became known that the Germans would succumb before they could obtain an atomic bomb. In the Hyde Park Agreement of September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill use the clear but cautious language that the bomb “could perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese”. That same month, in fact, the head of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves, organized a special group of airmen to practice with the atomic bomb. In the spring of 1945, he was ordered to make a target list, and in late May the target cities were designated.

Leagues were aware of the existence of the program, but were not particularly concerned about the use of the bomb: they favored its use, but left individual decisions for the future when and if it became available. Indeed, until April there was no reflection, and things followed a bureaucratic logic. When the prospect of its use was raised, concern developed, and disagreements and disputes arose. Various motives influence the attitude of the persons involved. However, it is important to separate the minor from the important. For example, some (e.g. Leslie Groves), were worried that, in the event of failure, they would have to account for the two billion dollars that would have been needlessly spent on building the atomic bomb. However, the costs were of little concern to Truman because he had no involvement in the decisions of the Manhattan Project.

The war had eroded the moral codes that excluded civilians from military targets. The bombing of Dresden by the British, and Tokyo by the Americans, which caused the deaths of at least 80,000 civilians, marked the new morality.

Two reasons favoured the use of the bomb. First, the war had eroded the moral codes that excluded civilians from military targets. The bombing of Dresden by the British, and Tokyo by the Americans, which caused the deaths of at least 80,000 civilians, marked the new morality. Second, the military had a sense from the briefings that this was a weapon of unprecedented power. However, it was still another weapon at their disposal. The distinction between conventional and unconventional weapons would come later, after the war was over. For these reasons, they took for granted the cost-benefit analysis of human lives that was at the core of the official narrative.

The choice of Hiroshima is exemplary. Suggestions about whether to demonstrate the power of the bomb in the presence of the Japanese, to choose a desert location or to give a warning were quickly dismissed. Given that the destructive power of the bomb had to be clearly demonstrated, Hiroshima was an ideal choice because it had not been damaged by bombing. The argument that there were combatants in the city is weak, because the majority were civilians, and morally flawed.

“For humans, choosing to kill an innocent person as a means to their ends is always murder, and murder is one of the worst acts,” Elizabeth Anscombe will write in Mr. Truman’s Degree, in which she explained why she protested when, in 1956, Truman was proposed for an honorary doctorate at Oxford University. In her reasoning, the innocent is understood to be not the morally blameless, but the civilian, the one who does no harm; and a clear distinction is made between the implied taking of life and the unintended but foreseeable as a contingency (collateral damage): the former is absolutely reprehensible, the latter in principle not. The dropping of the bomb caused the murder of tens of thousands of innocent people, and in this sense it can be called ‘mass murder’. To this heavy characterization, one must add the equally heavy one that it was an “act of terrorism” – “the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon,” in the elegant phrasing of Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson in a highly read article by him.

2.

Was the destruction of Hiroshima a necessary evil? The word “necessity” contains the concepts of necessary and inevitable. I believe it was neither necessary nor inevitable.

It was not necessary, and this is supported by the record of Gar Alperovitz, the majority of modern historians, the conclusions of the Strategic Bombing Survey (Strategic Bombing Survey, 1945) and a related study by the War Department Military Intelligence Division (1946), the opposition of leading military leaders (Generals Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, Admirals William Leahy, Ernst King and Chester Nimitz, Air Force Commander Henry Arnold, etc.etc.), as well as journalists of the era with close ties to military leaders of the time.

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The dropping of the bomb caused the murder of tens of thousands of innocents, and in this sense it can be called a “mass murder”. To this heavy characterization, should be added the equally heavy one that it was an “act of terrorism” – “the atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon,” in the elegant phrasing of Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson

Not only was capitulation a certainty, but it was probably going to happen before November 1, the Strategic Bombing Review concludes:

“Based on a thorough examination of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the Japanese leaders involved, the view of the Review is that certainly before 31 December 1945, and probably before 1 November 1945, Japan would have capitulated even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if an invasion had not been planned or contemplated.”

Without ignoring the effect of the two bombs, the Soviets’ entry into the Far East war, I believe, counted more in the decision to capitulate. Japan could not have simultaneously resisted the Soviets, its naval blockade (its merchant fleet was virtually destroyed), and conventional bombing. After all, the famous Ketsu-go strategy of fighting to the bitter end to defend the national territory from an American invasion presupposed Soviet neutrality. The Soviets’ decision took the military leadership by surprise, and vented the logic of defence to the bitter end – the refrain of fanatical militarists.

In addition, the Japanese rightly feared that the Soviets might, in addition to Majuria, Korea, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, conquer Japanese territory, especially the second largest island of Hokkaido. Even if this did not happen, the Soviets would have to be rewarded in some way, and a sharing of Hokkaido with the Americans would be highly likely, as Stalin desired.

In any case, few today are playing up the myth that hundreds of thousands of American soldiers would die in the event of an invasion. It is also untenable to claim that atomic bombs would cause fewer deaths than conventional bombing. At the end of July an order was issued giving fourth priority to the bombing of urban centres, after the railway network, aircraft production and equipment depots.

3.

It was also not inevitable. It is wrong to treat opinions as solid and unevolving. From Truman’s inauguration to Hiroshima there were disputes in both the US and Japanese administrations, particularly in the “Big Six” – the six-man supreme war college formed in May. The Under Secretary of State and former ambassador to Japan for nine years, Joseph Grewu, and Japan’s Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, consistently fought for conditional capitulation amid stiff opposition.

All the controversy surrounding the unconditional capitulation eventually shrunk to whether the emperor would retain his throne. The emperor was seen as a holy person, a living god, from whom emanated legislative, executive and judicial power – the famous and obscure kokutai (national constitution) which in the minds of extreme militarists had mystical dimensions. As such, it embodied the political and cultural essence of the nation, the Japanese national identity. Nevertheless, the system operated on the (disputed) principle of non-responsibility, i.e. the emperor could not overturn government decisions taken in his name: he was practically a figurehead.

The break with this tradition came when Hirohito decided, in order to save himself and the imperial office, to become actively involved in the decision to capitulate. It is interesting to read Tsuyoshi Hashegawa‘s account of how the addition of words to the text of the tradition, in order to remove the objections of the fanatical military, contributed to the dismantling of the kokutai.

Hasegawa also describes the adventure of a phrase that documents the rivalries in the US administration. In late May, the undersecretary of state, Joseph Grew, received the draft he had requested to clarify the meaning of Japan’s unconditional capitulation, which Truman had announced in his May 8 radio message announcing the end of the war in Europe.

Designed to be used as an ultimatum when the Battle of Okinawa was over, the draft contained the sentence, “This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present monarchy if it is demonstrated to the full satisfaction of the world that such a government would never desire aggression.” The draft was met with great hostility by Foreign Office officials, relatively indifferent by Truman, and rather friendly by others, who nevertheless recommended that it be kept in the drawer until the Potsdam conference (17 July to 2 August).

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On 2 July, Simpson handed Truman a memorandum to which was attached the draft of the Pochdam Conference’s draft telegram. The draft contained the proposal in question, and his argument was that the chances of accepting the capitulation were greatly increased if constitutional monarchy under the present monarchy was not ruled out. Finally, on 17 July, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee dropped the proposal, presumably after being informed by Admiral William Leechy that Truman and Burns intended to drop the promise to maintain the constitutional monarchy. Acceptance of such a capitulation by the Japanese had become virtually impossible.

Notably, the Americans have known since July 12, thanks to the so-called “magic intercepts”, that Togo asked Japan’s ambassador in Moscow, Naotaki Sato, for the mediation of the USSR, conveying the emperor’s will for a conditional capitulation. It is noteworthy that this first engagement of the Emperor passed almost indifferently. On 21 July 1945, Truman learns that the Alamogordo bomb test was successful, and its power beyond all expectations. Finally, on 26 July, the Potsdam Declaration containing the ultimatum of unconditional capitulation was announced and rejected. The hopes of the moderates in Japan will be raised by Stalin’s failure to sign the Declaration, but will evaporate after a few days when the USSR declares war on Japan on 8 August.

By the way, the Trinity Test was about the Plutonium 239 bomb (actually it was a device) to be dropped on Nagasaki. By contrast, the Hiroshima bomb was Uranium 235, which, according to Samuel Walker, Truman had been informed by early April that it did not need to be tested. Truman’s apparent enthusiasm and confidence on July 21 should be attributed in part to the need for politicians and military officials to have tangible evidence of the bomb’s power. However, a mystery remains.

A second fact is also worth noting. In early June, Truman informed Stimson that he had decided to move the meeting of the Big Three to July 15. Churchill made persistent efforts to hold the conference in June, but Truman refused. This is a related cable from Churchill: “I consider that July 15, I repeat July the month after June, is too late for the urgent matters requiring our attention… We suggested the 15th of June, repeat June the month before July, but if that is not possible why not the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd?” The urgent matters mentioned by Churchill concerned the rapidly deteriorating situation in Poland and the Balkans due to Soviet expansionism.

It is reasonable to assume that Truman wanted to have in his hands the results of the Trinity trial at Alamogordo, which was to take place on 16 July – “we will have more papers in our hands later than now,” he had said. It is also not unreasonable to suppose that momentum had been building towards the use of the bomb by Truman and Burns, aimed both at terrorizing the Japanese and at limiting Soviet claims in Europe and the Far East.

All this suggests that, despite individual efforts, there was no willingness in the US administration to discuss a compromise capitulation. Unconditional capitulation, by definition punitive, was rightly imposed on the Nazi regime by its very nature, but it should not have been imposed on the militaristic one in Japan.

ANAMPHIBOLA, the Japanese were not short of atrocities: Rape of Nanking (1937), biological and medical experiments of Unit 731, brutal treatment of prisoners of war. However, the Japanese leadership was engaged in a “classic” militaristic expansion, and it would have been sufficient to defeat it and impose restrictions on its military power without requiring the complete overthrow of its institutions, which were in any case the responsibility of its people. Regardless of whether the militaristic blindness of the Japanese leadership required fighting to the death, the futile death of soldiers is not consistent with the principles of just war.

On the contrary, Nazism represented the deepest darkness, the antithesis of civilization. Hitler’s regime threatened the most essential political and moral values of the civilized world, and this threat was an intrinsic characteristic: you cannot negotiate with anyone who seeks to annihilate large populations. Nazism’s unconditional capitulation and pulverisation were entirely justified.

There were strong indications that a section, including the Emperor, was looking positively and striving for a conditional capitulation. Discussions were likely to end in deadlock. However, a democratic country ‘owed’ it to the Japanese people, and certainly did not know in advance whether the negotiations would fail. In the words of Michael Walcher: “To use the atomic bomb, to murder and terrorize civilians without even attempting such experimentation [negotiations] was a double crime.”

I believe that both the incendiary bombing of Japanese cities that began in the spring of 1945 and the subsequent bombing of Hiroshima on August 6 were very, very great evils, and rightly treated as such

– John Roels

4.

As the foregoing has shown, I subscribe to the view of one of the most important (political) philosophers of the 20th century, John Roels: “I believe that both the incendiary bombing of Japanese cities that began in the spring of 1945 and the subsequent bombing of Hiroshima on August 6 were too great evils, and are rightly treated as such.” Because nowadays some would easily be tempted to label these as the offhand grandiloquence of a harmless philosopher, I note that Roels served as an infantryman in the Pacific between 1943-46, was awarded the Bronze Star for his gallantry, and never once invoked his military service on any occasion.

In any case, the atomic bomb was used, and that doesn’t change. What does change, however, are opinions about its use. In 1945, 85% of Americans approved of the use of the two atomic bombs; in 1991, 63% considered them a justified means of ending the war, dropping to 56% in 2015. The official narrative still seems to hold up, but as early as 1995, 50% favored an alternative to dropping the bomb, but without blaming Truman for his decision.

However, it has been a long time since the testimony to Congress as part of an official mission to Hiroshima by young Cornell University physicist Philip Morrison stirred the pot. His testimony, widely reproduced in the print and radio press, is considered the first formulation of a different approach to dropping the atomic bomb. It was December 1945, and the effort to impose the official narrative had long since begun.

On the same day as Nagasaki, Colonel Paul Leinberger released a staff memo at the request of the War Department’s chiefs. The memo emphasized that all atomic bomb-related announcements should “reaffirm … the long-standing lines of detection of U.S. air strikes as having sufficient military character to justify an attack under the rules of civilized war.” And with regard to the atomic bomb, Leinbarger explained that “this becomes particularly necessary because of the moral sensitivity with which the use of the new weapon is associated.” Some may read it as guilt for a heinous act; others as a cynical attempt at justification; others as a combination of the two, as is generally the case in real life.